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!Abstract 
It is well established that people like familiarity over novelty. Because that which is most 
familiar is frequently indicative of the way things are, favoring familiarity should create a 
psychological advantage for the status quo. In two studies, I tested the hypothesis that familiarity 
bias—susceptibility to the mere-exposure effect whereby attitude objects receive increasingly 
favorable evaluations due to repeated sensory experience—is foundational to ideological support 
for the status quo. In Study 1, individual variation in familiarity bias predicted greater Right-
Wing Authoritarianism. Existential threat was experimentally manipulated via the salience of 
international terrorism in Study 2, but was unsuccessful due to a major terrorist attack against 
Brussels, Belgium during data collection. The present research offers mixed support for a link 
between familiarity bias and ideological support for the status quo. Further tests are necessary to 
determine if and how susceptibility to the mere-exposure effect is related to and right-wing 
ideology and motivations to manage threat and uncertainty. 
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I.! Introduction 
People like to believe their attitudes and values are the products of logical analysis. 
Psychological research points to other, less obvious sources. One potential source is familiarity 
bias, which I define as susceptibility to the mere-exposure effect whereby attitude objects receive 
increasingly favorable evaluations due to repeated sensory experience. For example, people 
prefer name brand products (Janiszewski, 1993), political incumbents (Grush, McKeough, & 
Ahlering, 1978; Schaffner & Wandersman, 1974), known methods and strategies (Litt, Reich, 
Maymin, & Shiv, 2011), and comfort foods (Wansink, Cheney, & Chan, 2003) because these 
options possess heightened familiarity. Essentially we come to like, prefer, and favorably 
evaluate stimuli that are accompanied by a feeling of knowing (see Zajonc, 2001). 
Ideological attitudes that dictate “ought” from “is” may similarly extend from familiarity 
bias. Because that which is most familiar is frequently indicative of the way things are, 
familiarity is an advantageous characteristic of the status quo (Eidelman & Crandall, 2009). 
Moreover, support for the status quo and bias favoring familiarity appear connected by the same 
psychological motivations. Resistance to change, defense of tradition, and support for social 
convention follow from needs for certainty and security (for a review, see Jost, Glaser, 
Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003), as does susceptibility to a cognitive-affective bias favoring 
familiarity over novelty (e.g., Faulkner, Schaller, Park, & Duncan, 2004; Kruglanski, Freund, & 
Bar-Tal, 1996; Lee, 2001). From these connections, I develop an argument that familiarity bias is 
foundational to ideological support for the status quo, and it is through this basic cognitive-
affective mechanism that psychological needs for certainty and security promote the adoption of 
right-wing attitudes favoring the status quo. 
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A.! The Psychology of Familiarity 
 Familiarity refers to a subjective feeling of knowing usually based on prior experience. 
Familiarity cues what is good, right, appropriate, and true (Bornstein, 1989; Dechêne, Stahl, 
Hansen, & Wänke, 2010; Harrison, 1977; Zajonc, 1968), and its accompanying “warm glow” 
affords comfort and confidence (Titchener, 1915). Novelty, in contrast, is inherently associated 
with risk, uncertainty, and a potential for danger (Bronson, 1968). Thus, it is not surprising that 
people and animals like and prefer familiar stimuli to novel stimuli (Bornstein, 1989; Bronson, 
1968; Harrison, 1977; Zajonc, 1968). 
 Two complementary accounts attest to why positive evaluation is a consequence of 
familiarity. First, Zajonc (1968) proposed that “mere exposure” signals safety. In the absence of 
reinforcement and punishment, people and animals come to learn that familiar stimuli are 
benign, or void of risk and danger. This process is akin to classical conditioning whereby a novel 
unconditioned stimulus is paired with non-aversive outcomes upon each exposure; the result is a 
nonthreatening conditioned response that culminates in enhanced liking (Zajonc, 2001). Another 
account emphasizes a processing fluency advantage for familiar stimuli (Alter & Oppenheimer, 
2009). Familiar stimuli are recognized and processed faster and easier, and people instinctively 
misattribute the pleasantness of this easier processing to qualities of familiar stimuli (Alter & 
Oppenheimer, 2009; Dechêne et al., 2010). 
Several markers indicate that familiarity bias operates automatically. It is fast and 
efficient (Kawakami & Miura, 2014), occurs independent of conscious awareness (Bornstein & 
D’Agostino, 1992; Kunst-Wilson & Zajonc, 1980), and requires control to stifle its influence on 
explicit attitudes (Kawakami & Miura, 2014). In fact, stronger effects emerge when repeated 
exposure is outside of conscious awareness (Bornstein, 1989), suggesting that explicit 
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recognition may help people to reject processing fluency cues and thus attenuate familiarity bias 
(Bornstein & D’Agostino, 1994). 
The ubiquity of favoring familiarity across many species and circumstances implores 
consideration of its functional properties. Put simply, an instinct towards favoring familiarity 
over novelty possesses survival value (Bornstein, 1989; Bronson, 1968; Zajonc, 1968). 
Organisms indifferent to or unruffled by novelty surely expose themselves to more risks and 
dangers, such as disease, toxic foods, and aggression from strangers or outsiders. Bias favoring 
familiarity facilitates attachment and social bonding, which are essential to survival (see 
Baumeister & Leary, 1995). For example, mimicking newborn infants’ preference for the sound 
of their mothers’ voice, Rajecki (1974) found that baby chicks showed a strong preference for a 
tone repeatedly played while in an unhatched egg. Similarly, the “propinquity effect” 
demonstrates that people are more likely to form close relationships with others to which they 
are more proximal to and thus more familiar with (Festinger, Schachter, & Back, 1950). Because 
we are repeatedly exposed to our kin and community members, we form close relationships that 
promote collective survival. In summary, familiarity bias is adaptive for the reason that it 
promotes safety and solidarity. As advised by the old axiom, “Better the devil you know than the 
devil you don’t.” 
B.! Needs for Certainty and Security 
Familiarity affords one with a sense of certainty and security. People have an idea of 
what they will get when selecting familiar options, whereas unfamiliarity invites uncomfortable 
feelings of uncertainty. Indeed, evidence suggests that people seek out familiarity as a means to 
reduce epistemic uncertainty (see Lee, 1994, 2001). J. E. Crandall (1968) observed that those 
high (vs. low) in ambiguity intolerance evaluated stimuli more positively as a function of 
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familiarity. Moreover, experimentally inducing motivation for achieving epistemic certainty 
increases preferences for familiar stimuli in the classic mere-exposure paradigm (Kruglanski et 
al., 1996). 
People also seem to reach for what they know in response to threats. The threat of disease 
contamination corresponds with less openness to experience (Schaller & Murray, 2008), 
increases social conformity (Wu & Chang, 2012), and promotes the rejection of unfamiliar foods 
(Kandiah, Yake, Jones, & Meyer, 2006; Wansink et al., 2003) and peoples (Faulkner et al., 2004; 
Navarrete & Fessler, 2006; Navarrete, Fessler, & Eng, 2007). Experiencing anxiety amplifies 
favoritism of familiarity in humans (Schick, McGlynn, & Woolam, 1972), and rats show strong 
preferences for familiar areas of a maze after receiving electric shocks (Aitken, 1972; Aitken & 
Sheldon, 1970). More generally, stress triggers a desire to stay with what is is familiar 
(Vanbeselaere, 1980), even when such decisions lead to suboptimal outcomes (Litt et al., 2011). 
However, positive affect that signals safety and affirms security attenuates bias favoring 
familiarity (de Vries, Holland, Chenier, Starr, & Winkielman, 2010). 
Research and theory suggest that familiarity bias should strengthen in response to 
heightened needs for certainty and security. When feeling uncertain or perceiving threats, people 
are likely to seek out and trust in people, places, and things they have experience with. This 
adaptive, motivational bias favoring familiarity over novelty should be detectable at a cognitive-
affective level whereby subliminal repeated exposure produces positive evaluation. 
C.! Connections to Right-Wing Ideology 
At its core, right-wing ideology is characterized by preference for the status quo and 
acceptance of inequality and hierarchy (Altemeyer, 1981; Bobbio, 1996; Conover & Feldman, 
1981; Jost et al., 2003; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994; Wilson, 1973). These two 
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dimensions are embodied by complementary sets of attitudes and beliefs in Right-Wing 
Authoritarianism (RWA; Altemeyer, 1981, 1988) and Social Dominance Orientation (SDO; 
Pratto et al., 1994; Sidanious & Pratto, 1999). Whereas Altemeyer’s (1988) RWA scale includes 
items emphasizing tradition, conventionalism, and the status quo (e.g., “The ‘old-fashioned 
ways’ and the ‘old-fashioned values’ still show the best way to live,” “The established 
authorities generally turn out to be right about things, while the radicals and protestors are 
usually just ‘loud mouths’ showing off their ignorance”), Pratto et al.’s (1994) SDO scale taps 
preference for group-based hierarchy over egalitarianism (e.g., “Some groups of people are 
simply inferior to other groups,” “It’s OK if some groups have more of a chance in life than 
others”). Together, RWA and SDO culminate in sociocultural worldviews that form the basis of 
right-wing or conservative ideology (Duckitt & Sibley, 2009). 
Connections can be drawn between familiarity bias and right-wing ideology’s emphasis 
on support for the status quo. Due to direct experience or incidental exposure, existing states, 
normative practices, and traditions are accompanied by a sense of subjective familiarity. Staying 
with what is familiar is essentially staying with the status quo (e.g., Eidelman & Crandall, 2009), 
and enacting change usually involves embracing the unknown. Preferences for familiarity and 
the status quo are similarly rooted in psychological needs for certainty and security (Faulkner et 
al., 2004; Jost et al., 2003; Jost et al., 2007; Kruglanski et al., 1996; Lee, 1994, 2001; Schaller & 
Murray, 2008; Schick et al., 1972). Because status quo options possess familiarity, and 
familiarity affords one security and certainty, people may instinctively form attachments to the 
status quo through basic cognitive-affective mechanisms advantaging familiarity over novelty. It 
stands to reason that susceptibility to familiarity bias may serve as the psychological basis of 
ideological support for the status quo. 
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In contrast, acceptance of inequality and hierarchy seems weakly connected to familiarity 
bias. Social arrangements in Western democracies tend to be hierarchical, but it is also common 
or normative for people to endorse egalitarian values over hierarchy values (e.g., Pratto et al., 
1994; Van Berkel, Crandall, Eidelman, & Blanchar, 2015). Moreover, social hierarchy attitudes 
appear to follow from perceptions of the world as competitive and uncaring rather than 
dangerous and threatening (Duckitt, 2001; Duckitt & Sibley, 2010). Only to the extent that 
attitudes endorsing social inequality and hierarchy are in direct defense of a status quo ingrained 
in past experience would I expect familiarity bias to promote this dimension of right-wing 
ideology. Familiarity bias should underlie ideological support for the status quo, but not 
ideological endorsement of inequality and hierarchy.  
I test these hypotheses in two studies. In Study 1, individual variation in susceptibility to 
familiarity bias was measured via a novel task adapting and integrating the mere-exposure (e.g., 
Monahan, Murphy, & Zajonc, 2000; Moreland & Zajonc, 1976) and signal detection theory 
paradigms (e.g., Macmillian & Creelman, 2005). Bias in memory recognition due to repeated 
exposure was expected to be distinct from familiarity bias (e.g., Bornstein & D’Agostino, 1992; 
Moreland & Zajonc, 1977, 1979). Correlations were examined among familiarity bias and 
measures of ideological support for the status quo, social hierarchy attitudes, epistemic need for 
certainty, and a proclivity to think effortfully and carefully. Familiarity bias was predicted to 
correspond positively with ideological support for the status quo and needs for certainty, but to 
be unrelated to social hierarchy attitudes. Designed with consideration of Study 1 findings, Study 
2 aimed to investigate the causal role of perceived threat in facilitating familiarity bias. Prior to 
measuring familiarity bias, participants were randomly assigned to receive low- or high-threat 
salience information in the context of international tourism or terrorism. Variation in familiarity 
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bias should correlate positively with individual differences in perceptions of a dangerous world, 
epistemic needs for certainty, and ideological attitudes promoting the status quo, and 
experimentally manipulated threat was predicted to strengthen familiarity bias.  
II.! Study 1 
Study 1 was conducted for four reasons. First, it was necessary for developing a novel 
measure of familiarity bias through the adaptation and integration of the mere-exposure and 
signal detection theory paradigms. Initial attempts at construct measurement are rarely, if ever, 
optimal and require refinement. Second, I wanted to gauge whether enough individual variation 
in susceptibility to familiarity bias was meaningfully quantifiable across participants. Restricted 
variance would make it difficult to predict differences in ideological attitudes and motivational 
needs. Third, initial data allow for estimates of expected effect sizes, and thus help guide 
decisions on setting appropriately powered sample sizes for future research. Fourth, I desired a 
preliminary test of my hypothesis that bias from favoring subjective familiarity extends from 
psychological needs to manage uncertainty and threat and thus underlies ideological support for 
the status quo. I predicted that familiarity bias would positively correlate with RWA (i.e., 
ideological support for the status quo) and Need for Cognitive Closure (i.e., epistemic need for 
certainty), but to be unrelated to SDO (i.e., ideological endorsement of social hierarchy). 
Mediation analyses will assess if, and to what extent, familiarity bias is able to explain the 
relationship between need for cognitive closure and RWA.  
A.! Method 
Participants and procedure. General psychology students from the University of 
Arkansas were recruited for a study about “visual processing and social opinions.” Sample size 
was set to a minimum of 200 participants, and data collection across six weeks produced a final 
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sample of 220 participants (150 females; Mage = 19.37, SD = 2.50). Eleven additional participants 
failed to complete the study; five because the allotted time expired (30 minutes), two because of 
a language barrier, two because of an unscheduled power outage, one because she felt physically 
ill, and one because of a computer malfunction. After providing informed consent, participants 
completed a novel task designed to assess individual variation in susceptibility to familiarity bias 
and several measures of ideological attitudes and cognitive style. All measures are provided in 
Appendix A. 
 Measuring familiarity bias. Individual differences in susceptibility to familiarity bias 
were assessed via a novel adaptation and integration of the mere-exposure (e.g., Monahan et al., 
2000; Moreland & Zajonc, 1976) and signal detection paradigms (e.g., Macmillian & Creelman, 
2005). Participants studied 20 Chinese ideographs one at a time for 10 seconds each for a 
memory test. Next, in a supposed distractor task, participants attended to the center of a 
computer monitor (60 Hz refresh rate) for a slideshow subliminally presenting 40 Chinese 
ideographs: 20 studied (“old”) and 20 novel (“new”). Each ideograph was flashed rapidly at 
16.67 ms followed by a patterned mask (see Figure 1); 10 of the 20 studied ideographs and 10 of 
the 20 novel ideographs were presented 35 times (“high familiarity”) and the other half presented 
only once (“low familiarity”). This subliminal exposure phase was broken into five blocks (for 
details, see Figure 2). After a brief demographics survey, participants were shown each of the 40 
ideographs and responded to three questions to assess recognition memory and stimulus 
evaluation: (1) “Did you see this ideograph earlier in the study phase?” (New Image or Old 
Image), (2) “How confident are you in this judgment?” (-3 = Not At All Confident, +3 Very 
Confident), and (3) “How much do you like this ideograph?” (-3 = Don’t Like It At All, +3 Like It 
Very Much). 
 !
9 
Ideological attitudes. Participants completed the 14-item Right-Wing Authoritarianism 
(RWA) scale (Rattazzi Bobbio, & Canova, 2007; α = .79) and the 16-item Social Dominance 
Orientation (SDO) scale (Pratto et al., 1994; α = .92). RWA represents a set of stable and 
enduring ideological attitudes stressing conventionalism and traditionalism, submission to 
dominant leaders, and aggression towards social deviants (Altemeyer, 1981; Duckitt, 2001). 
SDO is a complementary ideological dimension stressing support for intergroup dominance and 
anti-egalitarianism (Ho et al., 2015; Pratto et al., 1994). Collectively, RWA and SDO represent 
goal schemas yielding sociocultural worldviews that form the core of conservative ideology 
(Duckitt & Sibley, 2009; see also Jost et al., 2003). 
Cognitive style. Individual differences in cognitive style were assessed via the 15-item 
Need for Cognitive Closure scale (NfCC; Roets & Van Hiel, 2011; α = .84) and the 18-item 
Need for Cognition scale (NfCog; Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984; α = .88). Need for cognitive 
closure represents motivation to acquire firm and unambiguous answers (i.e., uncertainty 
intolerance), and need for cognition is a proclivity to enjoy and engage in effortful thinking. 
Demographic survey. Participants reported their age, gender, race/ethnicity, ACT score, 
political ideology (1 = very liberal, 7 = very conservative), political partisanship (1 = more 
Democrat, 7 = more Republican), and whether they spoke Chinese.1 
B.! Results 
Stimulus evaluation. Replicating the classic “mere exposure” effect, a paired-samples t-
test indicated that participants overall evaluated high frequency exposure ideographs (M = 3.56, 
SD = 0.76) more favorably than low frequency exposure ideographs (M = 3.44, SD = 0.74), 
t(219) = 4.15, p < .001, d = .16, 95% CI for difference [0.06, 0.18]. However, because the mere 
exposure paradigm uses novel stimuli and studying half of the ideographs affords conscious 
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exposure, I conducted separate tests of novel (i.e., non-studied or “new”) and studied (i.e., “old”) 
ideographs. For novel ideographs, participants evaluated high frequency exposure ideographs (M 
= 3.39, SD = 0.82) more favorably than low frequency exposure ideographs (M = 3.17, SD = 
0.82), t(219) = 5.54, p < .001, d = .27, 95% CI for difference [0.14, 0.30]. However, no 
difference in evaluation emerged for studied ideographs (Ms = 3.74 vs. 3.72), t(219) = 0.47, p > 
.64, d = .02, 95% CI for difference [-0.06, 0.10]. A two-way repeated measures ANOVA 
confirmed this interaction pattern between ideographs (novel vs. studied) and exposure 
repetitions (high-frequency vs. low-frequency), F(1, 219) = 12.67, p < .001, !2p = .055, and also 
revealed a main effect of ideograph with participants evaluating studied ideographs more 
favorably than novel ideographs, F(1, 219) = 119.70, p < .001, !2p = .353, 95% CI for difference 
[0.37, 0.53] (see Figure 3). 
Computing familiarity bias scores. Using only non-studied (“new”) stimuli, a 
familiarity bias score was computed for each participant by subtracting his/her evaluative ratings 
of low exposure (“unfamiliar”) ideographs from evaluative ratings of high exposure (“familiar”) 
ideographs. Overall, participants scored above the zero mark (M = 0.22, SD = 0.59), suggesting a 
tendency to favor familiar stimuli over novel stimuli in evaluative judgments, t(219) = 5.54, p < 
.001, 95% CI [0.14, 0.30], d = .75. 
Memory performance. Several indexes of memory performance were examined. First, 
an overall d’ score (d’ composite) was computed (for details, see Green & Swets, 1966; Macmillan 
& Creelman, 1991) (d’ = z(probability of “Hit”) – z(probability of “False Alarm”)). Next, 
separate d’ scores were computed for bias-compatible (“old” ideographs + high exposure 
frequency; “new” ideographs + low exposure frequency) and bias-incompatible trials (“old” 
ideographs + low exposure frequency; “new” ideographs + high exposure frequency). A paired-
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samples t-test revealed that participants performed significantly better on bias-compatible trials 
(M = .81, SD = .49) relative to bias incompatible trials (M = .55, SD = .55), t(219) = 6.81, p < 
.001, d = .50, 95% CI for difference [0.04, 0.18]. Difference scores were computed as an index 
of individual variation in familiarity bias in memory judgments (d’ familiarity bias), whereby positive 
scores indicate better performance on bias-compatible trials relative to bias-incompatible trials 
and vice versa for negative scores. 
Zero-order correlations. Descriptive statistics and zero-order correlations among study 
variables are reported in Table 1. Supporting my primary hypotheses, RWA and NfCC positively 
correlated with individual variation in familiarity bias (rs = .21 and .15, 95% CIs [.09, .32] and 
[.04, .32], respectively) (see Figure 4). Endorsement of SDO was unrelated to familiarity bias in 
evaluative judgments (r = -.01, p > .92, 95% CI [-.16, .10]). Familiarity bias in memory 
judgments, as indicated by d’ familiarity bias scores, was unrelated to RWA, SDO, and NfCC. 
Although familiarity bias in evaluative judgments and in memory performance were positively 
correlated (r = .23, p = .004, 95% CI [.10, .34]), these two scores appear to represent distinct 
constructs (i.e., they are not collinear; see Tolerance and VIF) and only familiarity bias predicted 
RWA in a multiple regression model, b = 0.32, SE = .10, p = .003, 95% CI [0.11, 0.52], 
Tolerance = .95, VIF = 1.05. 
Mediation analysis. Using Hayes’s (2013) PROCESS macro for SPSS, I tested the 
prediction that the effect of need for cognitive closure on RWA would be mediated by individual 
variation in evaluative familiarity bias. NfCC predicted greater familiarity bias, b = 0.11, SE = 
.05, t(218) = 2.26, p < .025, 95% CI [0.01, 0.20], and familiarity bias predicted greater 
endorsement of RWA, b = 0.24, SE = .10, t(217) = 2.50, p < .014, 95% CI [0.05, 0.44]. The 
indirect effect through familiarity bias was significant, b = 0.03, SE = .016, 95% CI [0.004, 
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0.07], but the direct effect of NfCC on RWA remained statistically significant, b = 0.31, SE = 
.07, t(217) = 4.60, p < .001, 95% CI [0.18, 0.44]. These data suggest that the relationship 
between need for cognitive closure and RWA is partially mediated by susceptibility to 
familiarity bias in evaluative judgments. 
C.! Discussion 
Study 1 data afford several important conclusions. First, adaption of the mere-exposure 
paradigm for the familiarity bias task was successful. Participants evaluated high-exposure 
stimuli more favorably than low-exposure stimuli, and they also demonstrated suitable variability 
in susceptibility to familiarity bias in both evaluative and memory judgments. While these scores 
were positively correlated, they do appear to represent distinct constructs. Second, initial support 
was found for my hypothesis that familiarity bias is related to dimensions of right-wing ideology 
that emphasize tradition, conventionalism, and the status quo. RWA, but not SDO, was predicted 
by familiarity bias. Susceptibility to the mere-exposure effect may predispose ideological support 
for the status quo, but it is not connected to hierarchy attitudes emphasizing group dominance 
and anti-egalitarianism. Finally, these data are somewhat consistent with my prediction that 
epistemic psychological needs contribute to familiarity bias. Those high in NfCC demonstrated a 
stronger familiarity bias, and this partially mediated the positive relationship between NfCC and 
endorsement of RWA. However, it should be noted that this indirect effect through familiarity 
bias was very weak (R2 = .02). 
 These initial data are promising. However, I urge caution in their interpretation. Only 
correlational conclusions may be drawn and replication is necessary. Furthermore, the indirect 
effect through familiarity bias was weak (R2 = .02) and only partially explained the relationship 
between need for cognitive closure and RWA.  
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III.! Study 2 
Study 2 aimed to replicate and extend Study 1 findings by examining the causal role of 
perceived threat. Threat management has been linked to ideological support for the status quo 
(e.g., Duckitt & Fisher, 2003; Jost et al., 2007; Kay et al., 2009; Sales, 1972, 1973; Ullrich & 
Cohrs, 2007) and preferences for familiar stimuli (e.g., Faulkner, Schaller, Park, & Duncan, 
2004; Schaller & Murray, 2008; Schaller & Park, 2011). To manage perceived threats, people 
should find appeal in subjective familiarity. In turn, this should promote ideological support for 
the status quo in the form of RWA and system justification. This hypothesis was tested 
correlationally by assessing individual differences in needs for certainty and security, ideological 
attitudes, and familiarity bias, and also experimentally by manipulating threat salience 
(low/control vs. high) prior to measuring familiarity bias. Needs for certainty and security should 
predict ideological support for the status quo, and this relationship mediated by familiarity bias 
scores. Additionally, experimentally increasing the salience of threats is predicted to cause 
stronger familiarity bias. 
A.! Method 
Preregistration. Hypotheses, materials, and a priori decisions about sample size and data 
analysis have been preregistered online at the Open Science Framework (https://osf.io/). 
Participants and sample size. A target sample of 300 general psychology students from 
the University of Arkansas was set to participate in a study about “visual processing and social 
opinions.” Sample size was determined a priori using G*Power software (Faul, Erdfelder, 
Buchner, & Lang, 2009) by estimating the number of participants necessary to reach statistical 
power of .80 for a Pearson’s r effect size of .21 (see Study 1) for a two-tailed test with an alpha-
level of .05. The results of this analysis suggest a minimum sample of 173 participants. 
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However, this study also includes a between-subjects experimental component with an unknown 
effect size, and therefore sample size was conservatively set a priori to 300 participants. A total 
of 406 volunteers completed the study, but a computer network error caused a loss of data from 
106 participants, resulting in a final sample size of 300 participants (178 female; Mage = 19.18, 
SD = 2.10). No statistical analyses were computed en route to this sample; I analyzed the data 
and formed conclusions only after collecting this entire sample. 
Procedure. Participants were run in the lab in groups up to five but worked 
independently with privacy dividers separating individual workspaces. After providing informed 
consent, participants completed measures of epistemic certainty, existential security, and 
ideological attitudes. Next, participants completed the familiarity bias task. However, a high-
threat vs. low-threat/control manipulation was administered prior to the test phase. Finally, 
participants responded to items concerning their perceptions of international terrorism and 
completed a demographics survey. All measures are available in Appendix B and the 
experimental manipulation is available in Appendix C. 
Epistemic certainty. Individual differences in epistemic need for certainty were assessed 
via the 15-item Need for Cognitive Closure scale (NfCC; Roets & Van Hiel, 2010), the 10-item 
Openness to Experience subscale of the Big Five Inventory (John et al., 2008), and the 
Experience-Seeking subscale of the Sensation Seeking scale (Zuckerman, Eyesnck, & Eyesnck, 
1978). Respectively, these measures gauge a desire for achieving and maintaining firm and 
unambiguous answers (Kruglanski, 2004), “recurrent need to enlarge and examine experience” 
(McCrae & Costa, 1997, p. 826), and the “seeking of experience through the mind and senses, 
travel, and a nonconforming life-style” (Zuckerman et al., 1978, p. 140). 
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Existential security. Individual differences in existential need for security were assessed 
via the 10-item Perceptions of a Dangerous World scale (Duckitt, 2001), the 7-item Fear of 
Death subscale of the Death Attitude Profile-Revised (Wong, Reker, & Gesser, 1994), and the 6-
item Disease Avoidance subscale of the Fundamental Social Motives Inventory (Neel, Kenrick, 
& Neuberg, 2016). Each of these measures taps a desire to manage threats, whether they come in 
the form of a frightening and dangerous world, existential terror surrounding one’s own 
mortality, or risk associated with pathogens and disease. 
 Ideological attitudes. Participants completed several ideological measures assessing 
support for the status quo and opposition to equality. Ideological support for the status quo were 
measured via the 14-item RWA scale (Rattazzi et al., 2007) and 8-item System Justification scale 
(Kay & Jost, 2003). Ideological opposition to equality was measured via the 8-item SDO scale 
(Ho et al., 2015). 
Familiarity bias. Susceptibility to familiarity bias was assessed via an updated and 
streamlined version of the Familiarity Bias Test (for details, see Figure 5). The signal detection 
phase was removed because Study 1 indicated that familiarity bias was not due to recognition 
memory. Participants attended to a computer monitor (Philips Brilliance 242G5, 144 Hz refresh 
rate) for a slideshow subliminally presenting images of Chinese ideographs. Two sets of eight 
ideographs (Set A, Set B) were flashed rapidly on the screen for 6.94 ms with each followed by a 
patterned mask. Subliminal exposure to one set of ideographs 40 times (high frequency) and the 
other set of ideographs only once (low frequency) were randomly counterbalanced. Next, 
participants read one of two versions of a paragraph manipulating high-threat salience vs. low-
threat/control (see below) and then indicated how much they like each of the 16 Chinese 
ideographs using a -3 (don’t like it at all) to +3 (like it very much) response scale. 
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Threat salience. Prior to making evaluative ratings of Chinese ideographs within the 
Familiarity Bias Task, participants were randomly assigned to read one of two versions of a 
paragraph manipulating high-threat vs. low-threat/control salience in the context of international 
affairs. In the high threat condition, participants were reminded of recent terrorist attacks against 
Western countries and also noted worry over another possible attack on American soil. In the low 
threat/control condition, participants were informed of international tourism opportunities for 
Americans. For details, refer to the materials in Appendix C. 
International terrorism. As a manipulation check, participants indicated the extent to 
which they endorse (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree) three statements about the threat 
of international terrorism (adapted from Ullrich & Cohrs, 2007). 
Demographic survey. Participants reported their age, gender, race/ethnicity, ACT score, 
political ideology (1 = very liberal, 7 = very conservative), political partisanship (1 = more 
Democrat, 7 = more Republican), religion, and whether they speak Chinese. 
B.! Results 
Addressing a potential external threat to validity. At times societal events may, 
depending upon their relevance and level of impact, change how people respond within ongoing 
research in the social and behavioral sciences. On the morning of March 22, 2016, a major 
international terrorist attack was struck against Brussels, Belgium. This terror attack embodied 
the essence of my experimental manipulation of threat salience. Serendipitously, the University 
of Arkansas’s spring break occurred during the week of March 21st to 25th, and thus data 
collection was paused with a clean break between participation before and after this international 
terrorist attack. For the purposes of addressing this unexpected potential threat to internal 
validity, I computed analyses according to my original a priori data analysis plan, but also 
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amended this plan to include versions of these analyses accounting for time of participation 
before/after the Brussels terror attacks. 
Check on threat manipulation. Participants indicated their concern about international 
terrorism targeting the United States. Overall, participants in the high-threat salience condition 
(M = 5.16, SD = 1.12) more strongly endorsed concern about the threat of international terrorism 
compared to those in the control/low-threat condition (M = 4.87, SD = 1.25), t(298) = 2.10, p < 
.04, 95% CI for difference [0.02, 0.56], d = .24, !2p = .015. However, a two-way ANOVA 
including participation time before (n = 65) vs. after (n = 235) the Brussels terror attack as a 
between-subjects factor only revealed a main effect of time, F(1, 284) = 11.71, p = .001, !2p = 
.04, 95% CI for difference [0.24, 0.89], with those participating after the Brussels attack 
reporting stronger concern about the threat of international terrorism (M = 5.13, SD = 1.16) than 
those participating before (M = 4.56, SD = 1.24). The effect of the threat manipulation (M Threat = 
4.87, SD = 1.25 vs. M Control = 4.87, SD = 1.25) did reach conventional significance, F(1, 284) = 
3.36, p = .068, !2p = .01, 95% CI for difference [-0.02, 0.63], nor was there an interaction, F < 1, 
p > .81. 
Stimulus evaluation. Evaluative ratings of Chinese ideographs were assessed in a 2 
(Ideograph Set Ratings: Set A, Set B) × 2 (Subliminal Familiarity: Set A, Set B) × 2 (Threat 
Salience: low/control, high) mixed-model ANOVA with ratings of Ideograph Set within-subjects 
and Familiarity and Threat between-subjects. This analysis revealed a statistically significant 
effect of Ideograph Set, F(1, 296) = 4.32, p < .04, !2p = .01, 95% CI for difference [0.01, 0.18]; 
participants reported a relative preference for ideographs Set A (M = 4.64, SD = 0.89) over Set B 
(M = 4.42, SD = 0.88). A main effect of threat salience also reached significance, F(1, 296) = 
4.09, p < .05, !2p = .01, 95% CI for difference [0.01, 0.38], with participants liking all ideographs 
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less in the high-threat condition (M = 4.50, SD = 0.82) compared to the control condition(M = 
4.69, SD = 0.81). Demonstrating the mere-exposure effect, a significant Ideograph Set × 
Familiarity interaction was found, F(1, 296) = 42.82, p < .001, !2p = .13 (see Figure 6). 
Participants liked ideographs from Set A more when these stimuli were made subliminally 
familiar (M = 4.82, SD = 0.81) compared to when Set B was made subliminally familiar (M = 
4.43, SD = 0.94), F(1, 296) = 14.35, p < .001, !2p = .05, 95% CI for difference [0.19, 0.59], and 
participants liked ideographs from Set B more when these stimuli were made subliminally 
familiar (M = 4.66, SD = 1.01) compared to when Set A was made subliminally familiar (M = 
4.44, SD = 0.86), F(1, 284) = 3.86, p = .05, !2p = .01, 95% CI for difference [0.00, 0.43]. An 
uninteresting interaction between Threat and Ideograph Set barely failed to reach conventional 
criteria for statistical significance, F(1, 296) = 3.71, p = .055, !2p = .01, and no evidence was 
found for a main effect of subliminal familiarity or for any additional interactions, Fs < 1, ps > 
.45. 
Next, I recomputed this analysis as a four-way mixed-model ANOVA with the addition 
of participation time before/after the Brussels terror attack as a between-subjects factor. The 
results indicated the same significant Ideograph Set × Familiarity interaction demonstrating the 
classic mere-exposure effect, F(1, 292) = 29.74, p < .001, !2p = .09, and also a four-way 
interaction between ideograph set, subliminal familiarity, threat condition, and participation time, 
F(1, 292) = 3.90, p < .05, !2p = .01. No other effects emerged. This four-way interaction suggests 
that before the Brussels terror attack, participants favored whichever ideograph set was made 
familiar through subliminal repetition in the high-threat condition but not in the control 
condition. However, after the Brussels attack, participants only favored ideograph Set A (and not 
Set B) in the high-threat condition when it was made familiar. For ease of theoretical 
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interpretation, I computed a version of this analysis using familiarity bias scores as the dependent 
variable instead of within-subjects ratings of ideograph sets (see below). 
Familiarity bias. As in Study 1, familiarity bias scores were computed by subtracting 
participants’ evaluative ratings of low subliminal exposure (“unfamiliar”) ideographs from 
evaluative ratings of high subliminal exposure (“familiar”) ideographs. Overall, participants 
scored above the zero mark (M = 0.32, SD = 0.79), indicating a propensity to favor familiar 
stimuli over novel stimuli in evaluative judgments, t(299) = 6.89, p < .001, 95% CI [0.23, 0.41], 
d = .81.  
Next, I computed a 2 (Subliminal Familiarity: Set A, Set B) × 2 (Threat Salience: 
low/control, high) × 2 (Time: before, after Brussels attack) between-subjects ANOVA. This 
analysis revealed a non-significant effect of threat condition, F(1, 292) = 2.98, p = .085, !2p = 
.01, 95% CI for difference [-0.03, 0.41], and a qualifying significant Threat x Time interaction, 
F(1, 292) = 3.90, p < .05, !2p = .01 (see Figure 7). Before the Brussels terror attack, participants 
in the high-threat condition demonstrated greater familiarity bias (M = 0.48, SD = 0.98) than 
those in the control condition (M = 0.07, SD = 0.60), F(1, 292) = 4.37, p < .04, !2p = .02, 95% CI 
for difference [0.02, 0.79]. However, after the Brussels terror attack, no difference in familiarity 
bias was found between participants in the high-threat (M = 0.31, SD = 0.78) and control 
conditions (M = 0.34, SD = 0.80), F(1, 292) = 0.70, p > .79, !2p = .00, 95% CI for difference [-
0.18, 0.23].  
I further probed this Participation Time by Threat Condition interaction by examining 
changes in familiarity bias with respect to the number of days and weeks before/after the 
Brussels terror attack. Illustrated in Figure 8, LOESS curves plotting the relationship between 
familiarity bias and the number of days before/after the Brussels attack within each threat 
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condition (high-threat vs. control) suggest that high-threat increased familiarity bias prior to the 
Brussels attack but was attenuated following the attack with a resurgence of the effect of threat 
two weeks later. Next, I computed a 2 (Subliminal Familiarity: Set A, Set B) × 2 (Threat 
Salience: low/control, high) × 2 (Time: before, 1 week after, 2 weeks after, 3 weeks after attack) 
between-subjects ANOVA to assess for changes in the effect of threat on familiarity bias as a 
function of week participated. Only a significant effect of subliminal familiarity was found, F(1, 
284) = 6.16, p < .02, !2p = .02, 95% CI for difference [0.05, 0.43], such that familiarity bias was 
stronger when Set A (M = 0.41, SD = 0.86) vs. Set B (M = 0.22, SD = 0.71) was made 
subliminally familiar. The Threat Condition × Participation Time interaction failed to reach 
conventional significance criteria, F(3, 284) = 1.60, p = .19, !2p = .02. Although the overall 
pattern was discernable (see Figure 9), a customized linear contrast (weights: control -1, 1, 1, -1; 
high-threat 1, -1, -1, 1) testing for attenuation and then reemergence of the threat of effect on 
familiarity bias post-two weeks also fell short of conventional significance, F(1, 292) = 3.11, p < 
.08, !2p = .01. 
Zero-order correlations. Descriptive statistics and zero-order correlations among study 
variables across all conditions and time periods are reported in Table 2. Overall, a positive 
correlation was found between Belief in a Dangerous World and Familiarity Bias, r = .11, p = 
.05, 95% CI [.002, .23]; the more dangerous participants perceived the world, the greater 
familiarity bias they demonstrated. No relationship was observed between RWA and Familiarity 
Bias, r = .01, p > .87, 95% CI [.002, .23]. Self-reported preference for familiarity over novelty 
corresponded with greater RWA, r = 19, p = .001, 95% CI [.08, .30], NfCC, r = 25, p < .001, 
95% CI [.15, .34], and self-reported conservatism, r = .12, p = .04, 95% CI [.02, .23], and 
corresponded with less Openness to Experience, r = -.12, p < .05, 95% CI [-.24, .003], and 
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Experience-Seeking, r = -.28, p = .05, 95% CI [-.37, -.19]. Self-reported preference for 
familiarity was unrelated to System Justification, SDO, and measures of existential security 
(Belief in a Dangerous World, Fear of Death, and Disease Avoidance). Replicating past research, 
political conservatism was associated with greater RWA, System Justification, SDO, NfCC, 
Belief in a Dangerous World, and Disease Avoidance, and associated with less Openness to 
Experience and Experience-Seeking (see Table 2). However, contrary to past research, political 
liberalism was associated with greater Fear of Death (cf. Jost et al., 2007). 
Zero-order correlations were also broken down by threat condition and participation 
before/after Brussel terror attack in Tables 3 and 4, respectively. Because linear relationships 
were fairly consistent across threat conditions and this manipulation was administered following 
all measures except the Familiarity Bias Task and manipulation check, I focus on differences 
observed across participation time. Before the Brussels attack, Familiarity Bias was positively 
associated with System Justification, r = .21, p = .095, 95% CI [-.02, .42], and Disease 
Avoidance, r = .23, p < .07, 95% CI [.01, .41], and negatively associated with Experience 
Seeking, r = -.24, p < .06, 95% CI [-.46, -.02]. After the attack, Familiarity Bias was only 
positively associated with Belief in a Dangerous World, r = .13, p = .052, 95% CI [-.02, .26].  
Shifts in response to the Brussels attack. Reported in Table 5, I next examined shifts in 
study variables as a function of the number of days before/after the Brussels terror attack. Since 
this terror attacked was unexpected, the number of days leading up to the morning of March 22nd 
should not be related to any study variables. However, if the participants were affected by the 
Brussels terror attack, the number of days following it should reflect a return to “homeostasis” 
levels. Days before the attack was negatively associated with self-reported conservatism; I 
suspect this is a spurious effect found in one of 13 tests. Interesting, the number of days 
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following the terror attack was negatively associated with RWA, r = -.11, p = .085, 95% CI [-
.24, .01], System Justification, r = -.10, p = .13, 95% CI [-.22, .04], NfCC, r = -.16, p = .014, 
95% CI [-.28, -.04], and Disease Avoidance, r = -.12, p = .074, 95% CI [-.24, .00], and it was 
positively associated with Openness to Experience, r = .15, p = .021, 95% CI [.04, .26], and 
Experience Seeking, r = .16, p = .013, 95% CI [.05, .28]. The clearest trend indicates that 
epistemic needs for certainty may have become heightened in response to the Brussels terror 
attack with participants readjusting to return to their normative baseline levels over time. While 
not as strong, the same may be true for ideological support for the status quo with regard to 
RWA and System Justification, which also tended to decline following the attack. 
For greater confidence in these linear trends, I examined time-based changes in 
ideological variables (RWA, System Justification, SDO), epistemic needs variables (NfCC, 
Openness to Experience, Experience-Seeking), and existential needs variables (Belief in a 
Dangerous World, Fear of Death, Disease Avoidance) within the context of MANCOVA and 
MANOVA. Separate versions of each MANCOVA were computed for number of days before 
and number of days after the attack. MANOVAs were computed with week of participation as a 
between-subjects factor (before, 1 week, 2 weeks, 3 weeks after) and follow-up with customized 
linear trend analyses. The details of these analyses are reported in Table 6 and support the 
interpretation that right-wing ideological views and epistemic needs for certainty became 
heightened immediately following the attack and gradually declined with the passage of time. 
C.! Discussion 
Study 2 again reproduced the classic mere-exposure effect. Participants favored high-
frequency ideographs to low-frequency ideographs. While Study 1 conflated exposure frequency 
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with ideograph pattern, Study 2 provides stronger evidence by counter-balancing which of two 
sets of ideographs was made subjectively familiar with repetition. 
Other designed tests were complicated by unforeseeable and unavoidable circumstances. 
The internal validity of Study 2 was disrupted by the Brussels terror attack and its news 
coverage. The threat salience manipulation was overshadowed, the effect of threat on familiarity 
bias was attenuated, and epistemic needs shifted all as a function of participation time before vs. 
after the attack. Because of these complications, interpreting the results of Study 2 is challenging 
and the reliability of these outcomes uncertain. Prior to the attack, participants reminded of 
dangerous threats posed by terrorist organizations demonstrated susceptibility to the mere-
exposure effect. However, this effect of high-threat salience suddenly vanished among those 
participating after the attack, and the manipulation check failed. While this could be interpreted 
as evidence that threat causes greater familiarity bias, it is possible that “the effect” simply 
vanished with a larger sample size. Correlational evidence was also inconsistent. Familiarity bias 
scores positively corresponded with belief in a dangerous world but not with RWA, system 
justification, disease avoidance, and fear of death. 
Methodological changes in the Familiarity Bias Test between Studies 1 and 2 are also 
noteworthy. It is possible that the memory test component employed in Study 1 more effectively 
distracted participants from the source of familiarity. In Study 2, participants may have made a 
clearer connection between the exposure and evaluation tasks. When participants are able to 
consciously attribute a sense of familiarity to exposure, the exposure-affect link is disrupted (see 
Bornstein, 1989). It is plausible that these changes contributed to the inconsistent findings 
between Studies 1 and 2. 
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IV.! General Discussion 
People overwhelming like what feels familiar to what is novel. Across two studies, 
participants reported preference for Chinese ideographs to which they received greater 
subliminal exposure. These findings come at a time when concerns about the replicability of 
psychological science have cast doubt and uncertainty upon cherished theories and findings (see 
Nosek et al., 2016; Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2011; cf. Klein et al., 2014). However, the 
mere-exposure effect appears to be alive and well. Effect sizes in Study 1 (d = .75) and Study 2 
(d = .81) were consistent and large in magnitude, echoing Bornstein’s (1989) conclusion three 
decades earlier that “the exposure-affect relationship is robust and reliable” (p. 268). 
Additionally, a unique contribution of this work is the creation of an individual difference 
measure of susceptibility to the mere-exposure effect. Familiarity bias is quantifiable and people 
show appreciable variability that is distinct from memory recognition. While further validation is 
necessary, this psychological instrument may prove to be a promising tool for future research. 
I proposed that this propensity to positively evaluate high-frequency stimuli may act as a 
cognitive-affective basis of ideological support for the status quo. Relative to its alternatives, the 
status quo is apt to receive considerable exposure, albeit incidental, and thus enjoy evaluative 
benefits. Supporting this hypothesis, familiarity bias scores predicted stronger endorsement of 
RWA, but not SDO, in Study 1. However, inconsistent results were found in Study 2 with no 
linear relationship between familiarity bias and RWA, and conditional evidence based on time of 
participation for a positive relationship between familiarity bias and system justification. 
Because of the threat to internal validity posed by the Brussels terror attack, interpreting the 
results of Study 2 data is challenging and uncertain. Additionally, it is possible that the 
methodological changes in the Familiarity Bias Test from Study 1 to Study 2 played a role in 
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these inconsistent findings. The memory test component in Study 1 provided a better cover story, 
and so participants in Study 2 may have had some knowledge of what was being studied. 
According to Bornstein’s (1989) research, naivety of the source of familiarity is essential to the 
mere-exposure paradigm.  
A.! Threat Management and Familiarity Bias 
Preference for subjective familiarity should be evolutionarily adaptive in that avoiding 
novelty reduces one’s exposure to dangers and risks. However, arguments connecting the mere-
exposure effect to threat management have been limited to theoretical discussions with no direct 
evidence for or against (e.g., Bornstein, 1989; Harrison, 1977; Stang, 1973; Zajonc, 1968). In 
Study 2, I tested this hypothesis in two ways. First, I measured individual differences in security 
needs and familiarity bias, and second I experimentally manipulated the salience of dangerous 
threats prior to assessing familiarity bias. A weak positive relationship was found between 
susceptibility to the mere-exposure effect and belief in a dangerous world, and no relationships 
emerged with disease avoidance and fear of death. Manipulating threat provided mixed results 
with high-threat producing stronger familiarity bias prior to the Brussels terror attack but not 
afterwards. In fact, the manipulation check indicated that participation before/after the Brussels 
attack completely overshadowed the threat salience manipulation.  
One potential strategy for examining the effect of threat on familiarity bias is to combine 
and recode data from Studies 1 and 2 to reflect participation under circumstances of low- vs. 
high-threat. The control/low-threat level (n = 254) includes all participants in Study 1 since they 
received no threat-manipulation and those within the control condition in Study 2 that also 
participated prior to the Brussels terror attack. The high-threat level (n = 266) includes those in 
Study 2 within the high-threat condition and/or participating after the Brussels terror attack. I 
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then computed an ANCOVA to examine the effect of threat (low vs. high) on participants’ 
familiarity bias scores with study participation (Study 1 or 2) as a covariate; this revealed a 
significant main effect of threat, F(1, 517) = 4.48, p = .035, !2p = .01, 95% CI for difference 
[0.02, 0.53], and no effect for study participation, F(1, 517) = 0.15, p > .70. Those completing 
the familiarity bias task under circumstances of high-threat (M = 0.35, SD = 0.81) demonstrated 
greater familiarity bias than those participating under circumstances of control/low-threat (M = 
0.03, SD = 0.61).  
Although no casual inferences may be drawn, these data lend partial support for my 
hypothesis that existential threat fosters greater susceptibility to the mere-exposure effect. 
Correlational evidence for this relationship was weak and inconsistent, however. This seems odd, 
but perhaps only particular forms of threat elicit familiarity bias. Subsequent, cleaner tests will 
be necessary to confirm or refute these tentative conclusions. 
B.! The Role of Uncertainty Avoidance in Familiarity Preference 
Uncertainty avoidance is another psychological motivation relevant to understanding the 
mere-exposure effect. Opting in favor of what is familiar over what is novel should reduce or 
prevent feelings of uncertainty (e.g., Crandall, 1968; Lee, 1994, 2001; Kruglanski et al., 1996). 
However, I found little to mixed evidence in support of this hypothesis. In Study 1 familiarity 
bias scores increased as NfCC increased, but no such relationship was found in Study 2. Other 
measures tapping need for epistemic certainty were uncorrelated to familiarity bias; neither 
Openness to Experience nor Experience Seeking predicted susceptibility to the mere-exposure 
effect in Study 2. However, participants’ self-reported general preferences for familiarity over 
novelty were correlated positively with NfCC and negatively with Openness to Experience and 
Experience Seeking as would be expected. Because this self-report measure was uncorrelated 
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with familiarity bias scores, it’s possible that these questions actually measure a desire for 
certainty. As with connections to threat management, these data—at best—lend inconsistent 
support to the claim that motivation to avoid uncertainty underlies the mere-exposure effect. 
C.! Ideological and Epistemic Shifts Following the Brussels Attack 
Collecting data on participants’ ideological views and motivational needs during periods 
of time before and after the Brussels terror attack affords an interesting and unique opportunity 
to examine psychological shifts. Leaning on past research connecting existential threats to 
ideological and epistemic responses (e.g, Thorisdottir & Jost, 2011), I tested for a theoretical 
pattern in which right-wing ideology, epistemic needs for certainty, and existential needs for 
security rise following to the Brussels terror attack and then gradually return to a natural 
“homeostasis” level for individual persons. Endorsement of RWA and measures tapping need for 
epistemic certainty largely conformed to this expected pattern (see Tables 5 - 6). In the days and 
week immediately following the attack, participants overall responded with greater RWA and 
NfCC and with less Openness to Experience and Experience Seeking relative to those 
participating before the attack. Responses on these variables then gradually returned to pre-attack 
levels. This is quite impressive considering that individual difference constructs like RWA, 
NfCC, Openness to Experience, and Experience Seeking are fairly stable. The uptick in RWA 
appears to have been partially driven by changes in epistemic motivation. Depicted in Figure 10 
and consistent with the findings of Thorisdottir and Jost (2011), epistemic motivation partially 
mediated the relationship between international terrorism concerns and RWA while controlling 
for the experimental condition, total indirect effect: b = 0.08, SE = .027, 95% CI [0.03, 0.14]. 
These data suggest that people experienced temporary shifts in their epistemic needs, and 
consequently their ideological views, in response to fear from an international terrorist attack. 
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D.! Concluding Remarks 
People like and prefer familiarity over novelty. This familiarity bias is robust and reliable 
and quantifiable as an individual difference variable. Although theory argues for links between 
familiarity bias and needs to manage threats and uncertainty, the present research offers mixed 
support for these ideas as well as my hypothesis that familiarity bias may underlies ideological 
support for the status quo. Further tests are necessary to determine if and how susceptibility to 
the mere-exposure effect is related to and right-wing ideology and motivations to manage threats 
and uncertainty. 
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VI.! Footnote 
1 Although two participants indicated that they knew some Chinese, none reported being fluent. 
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VII.!Figures and Tables 
A.! Figure Captions 
Figure 1. Stimulus presentation within the familiarity bias task. 
  
Figure 2. Schematic description of the familiarity bias task used in Study 1. 
  
Figure 3. Evaluation of Chinese ideographs as a function of subliminal exposure repetitions and 
novelty. Error bars indicate 95% CIs. 
 
Figure 4. Endorsement of Right-Wing Authoritarianism as a function of susceptibility to 
familiarity bias. Dashed lines indicate 95% CIs for the linear regression line. 
 
Figure 5. Schematic description of the familiarity bias task used in Study 2. 
 
Figure 6. Evaluation of Chinese ideograph sets as a function of subliminal familiarity and threat 
condition. Error bars indicate 95% CIs. 
 
Figure 7. Familiarity bias as a function of threat condition and participation before/after Brussels 
terror attack. Error bars indicate 95% CIs. 
 
Figure 8. Familiarity bias as a function of threat condition and number of days before/after 
Brussels terror attack (LOESS curve).  
 
 
Figure 9. Familiarity bias as a function of threat condition and number of weeks before/after 
Brussels terror attack.  
 
Figure 10. Three mediation models testing for epistemic motivation as an explanation for the 
relationship between international terrorism concern and RWA. 
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Figure 2 
 
 
 
Phase 
 
Block Description Presentations Time 
Phase I: Study 
 
Study Phase 
 
Study 20 ("old") ideographs for later memory test 1 x 20 ideographs 10 sec 
Phase II:  
Subliminal Exposure 
 
 
Block 1 
 
20 "familiar" (10 new, 10 old) / 4 "unfamiliar” (2 new, 2 old) 7 x 20 / 1 x 4 16.67 ms 
 
Block 2 
 
20 "familiar" (10 new, 10 old) / 4 "unfamiliar” (2 new, 2 old) 7 x 20 / 1 x 4 16.67 ms 
 
Block 3 
 
20 "familiar" (10 new, 10 old) / 4 "unfamiliar” (2 new, 2 old) 7 x 20 / 1 x 4 16.67 ms 
 
Block 4 
 
20 "familiar" (10 new, 10 old) / 4 "unfamiliar” (2 new, 2 old) 7 x 20 / 1 x 4 16.67 ms 
 
Block 5 
 
20 "familiar" (10 new, 10 old) / 4 "unfamiliar” (2 new, 2 old) 7 x 20 / 1 x 4 16.67 ms 
Phase III: Test 
 
Test Phase 
 
(1) New or Old?  /  (2) Confidence (7-pt)  /  (3) "Liking" ratings (7-pt) 1 x 40 ideographs N/A 
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Figure 5 
 
 
 
Phase 
 
Block Description Presentations Time 
Phase I:  
Subliminal Exposure 
 
 
Block 1 
 
8 of 8 "familiar" / 2 of 8 "unfamiliar" 10 x 8 / 1 x 2 6.94 ms 
 
Block 2 
 
8 of 8 "familiar" / 2 of 8 "unfamiliar" 10 x 8 / 1 x 2 6.94 ms 
 
Block 3 
 
8 of 8 "familiar" / 2 of 8 "unfamiliar" 10 x 8 / 1 x 2 6.94 ms 
 
Block 4 
 
8 of 8 "familiar" / 2 of 8 "unfamiliar" 10 x 8 / 1 x 2 6.94 ms 
Phase II: Test 
 
Evaluation 
 
"Liking" ratings (-3 Don't Like It At All, +3 Like It Very Much) 1 x 16 ideographs N/A 
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B.! Tables 
 
Table 1 
Descriptive statistics and zero-order correlations among variables (Study 1).  
                      
                  Variable M (SD) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
                      
           
  1.   Familiarity bias 0.22 (0.59) ---         
  2.   d’ familiarity bias  0.26 (0.56)     .23*** ---        
  3.   d’ composite memory 1.13 (0.75)    -.10    -.12† ---       
  4.   Right-Wing Authoritarianism 3.83 (0.90)     .21**     .03    -.09 ---      
  5.   Social Dominance Orientation 2.72 (1.08)    -.01    -.01    -.06     .37*** ---     
  6.   Self-reported ideology 4.23 (1.52)     .06    -.04     .02     .63***     .49*** ---    
  7.   Political partisanship 4.39 (1.65)     .07    -.04    -.02     .52***     .46***     .81*** ---   
  8.   Need for cognition 4.25 (0.84)    -.06     .14*    -.03    -.33***    -.13†    -.21**     -.26*** ---  
  9.   Need for cognitive closure 4.54 (0.85)     .15*    -.01    -.12†     .32***     .05     .17*     .13†    -.24*** --- 
 10.  ACT score a 25.5 (3.58)    -.03     .08     .21**    -.16*    -.07    -.02     .03     .13†    -.01 
           
 
Note: Familiarity bias scores refer to evaluations of novel (i.e., non-studied) Chinese ideographs. Self-reported ideology (1 = very liberal, 7 = very 
conservative); Political partisanship (1 = more Democrat, 7 = more Republican). 
 
N = 220; a N = 205 
 
***p ≤ .001  **p ≤ .01  *p ≤ .05  †p ≤ .10 
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Table 2 
Descriptive statistics and zero-order correlations among study variables collapsed across threat condition and participation time (Study 2).  
                             
                  Variable M (SD) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
                             
               
 1.   Familiarity bias  0.31 (0.79)  ---             
 2.   Familiarity (self-report) 4.26 (0.67) -.05 ---            
 3.   RWA 3.69 (0.94) .01 .19*** ---           
 4.   System justification 3.80 (0.89) .05 .00 .24*** ---          
 5.   SDO 3.26 (1.00) .10† -.01 .41*** .25*** ---         
 6.   Need for cognitive closure 4.29 (0.77) -.03 .25*** .34*** .06 .10† ---        
 7.   Openness to experience 4.81 (0.80) .02 -.12* -.31*** -.20*** -.22*** -.32*** ---       
 8.   Experience seeking 4.27 (1.04) -.06 -.28*** -.51*** -.17** -.22*** -.34*** .44*** ---      
 9.   Dangerous world 4.07 (0.73) .11* .01 .35*** -.16** .05 .14* -.08 -.12* ---     
10.  Disease avoidance 4.04 (1.16) .01 .03 .14* .03 .00 .14* -.08 -.23*** .17** ---    
11.  Fear of death 3.48 (1.43) .03 .10† -.04 .01 -.00 .15** -.03 .05 .02 .02 ---   
12. Terrorism concerns 5.01 (1.20) -.03 -.06 .27*** .13* .14* .22*** -.18** -.14* .32*** .11† .01 ---  
13.  Self-reported ideology 4.09 (1.52) .03 .12* .61*** .30*** .43*** .17** -.22*** -.39*** .20*** .12* -.17** .30*** --- 
14.  ACT score a 25.29 (3.55) -.02 -.05 -.27*** .05 -.04 -.07 .12* .05 -.25*** -.05 -.10† -.02 -.09 
               
  
Note: RWA = Right-Wing Authoritarianism; SDO = Social Dominance Orientation; Self-reported ideology (1 = very liberal, 7 = very conservative). 
 
N = 300; a N = 290 
 
***p ≤ .001  **p ≤ .01  *p ≤ .05  †p ≤ .10 
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Table 3 
Descriptive statistics and zero-order correlations among study variables as a function of threat condition (Study 2).  
                             
                  Variable M (SD) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
                             
  -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  THREAT CONDITION  ----------------------------------------------- 
 1.   Familiarity bias  0.35 (0.82) 0.28 (0.76) --- -.12 .01 .08 .04 -.04 .02 -.02 .08 -.07 -.04 -.04 .06 
 2.   Familiarity (self-report) 4.25 (0.70) 4.27 (0.65) .03 --- .22** -.12 -.10 .17* -.15
† -.26** .13 .06 .06 .05 .11 
 3.   RWA 3.64 (0.95) 3.73 (0.93) .01 .16* --- .13
† .39*** .37*** -.27*** -.49*** .37*** .20* -.13 .31*** .57*** 
 4.   System justification 3.83 (0.90) 3.76 (0.89) .02 .13 .35*** --- .22** .07 -.17* -.06 -.22** .07 .03 .04 .24** 
 5.   SDO 3.22 (1.02) 3.29 (0.98) .16* .08 .42*** .25*** --- .14
† -.21** -.23** .03 .03 -.01 .18* .46*** 
 6.   Need for cognitive closure 4.24 (0.76) 4.34 (0.78) -.02 .32*** .30*** .06 .06 --- -.36*** -.44*** .21** .08 .14
† .31*** .23** 
 7.   Openness to experience 4.78 (0.76) 4.83 (0.83) .03 -.08 -.35*** -.24** -.23** -.27*** --- .46*** -.06 .01 -.03 -.15
† -.16* 
 8.   Experience seeking 4.31 (1.05) 4.24 (1.02) -.10 -.31*** -.54*** -.29*** -.20* -.25*** .41*** --- -.17* -.26*** .05 -.17* -.33*** 
 9.   Dangerous world 4.12 (0.71) 4.02 (0.75) .14
† -.11 .35*** -.11 .08 .09 -.09 -.07 --- .24** .03 .34*** .23** 
10.  Disease avoidance 4.02 (1.15) 4.05 (1.18) .09 -.00 .09 -.00 -.02 .19* .16
† -.21* .11 --- -.05 .07 .16* 
11.  Fear of death 3.54 (1.30) 3.42 (1.55) .09 .14
† .04 -.02 .01 .17* -.04 .04 .02 .08 --- .04 -.20* 
12. Terrorism concerns 5.16 (1.12) 4.87 (1.25) -.03 -.16* .26** .21** .12 .16* -.22** -.13 .30*** .15
† -.03 --- .33*** 
13.  Self-reported ideology 4.07 (1.59) 4.11 (1.46) .00 .13* .65*** .37*** .39*** .11 -.28*** -.46*** .18* .09 -.15
† .38*** --- 
14.  ACT score a b 25.39 (3.47) 25.19 (3.63) -.02 -.08 -.20* .07 -.01 -.10 .10 -.01 -.20* -.03 -.18 -.01 .03 
  --------------------------------------------  CONTROL CONDITION  ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Note: Means, standard deviations, and correlation coefficients reported above and below the table diagonal correspond to the threat and control conditions, respectively. RWA = Right-
Wing Authoritarianism; SDO = Social Dominance Orientation; Self-reported ideology (1 = very liberal, 7 = very conservative). 
 
Control Condition: N = 151 (aN = 145); Threat Condition: N = 149 (bN = 145) 
 
***p ≤ .001  **p ≤ .01  *p ≤ .05  †p ≤ .10 
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Table 4 
Descriptive statistics and correlations among study variables as a function of participation before/after the Brussels terror attack (Study 2).  
                             
                  Variable M (SD) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
                             
  ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  BEFORE TERROR ATTACK  ------------------------------------------ 
 1.   Familiarity bias  0.27 (0.82) 0.32 (0.78) --- -.12 .04 .21
† .09 .11 .06 -.24† .06 .23† .04 .02 .06 
 2.   Familiarity (self-report) 4.42 (0.65) 4.22 (0.68) -.03 --- .18 -.08 -.21
† .26* -.21† -.34** .08 .11 -.03 .20 .16 
 3.   RWA 3.56 (0.97) 3.72 (0.93) -.00 .21* --- .19 .34** .34** -.38** -.66*** .41*** .20* -.07 .38** .57*** 
 4.   System justification 3.88 (0.96) 3.78 (0.88) .00 .02 .26*** --- .38** .20 -.06 -.18 -.15 .18 .17 .29* .24
† 
 5.   SDO 3.09 (0.99) 3.30 (1.00) .09 .05 .42*** .22*** --- -.09 -.18 -.22
† -.06 -.05 .05 .23† .43*** 
 6.   Need for cognitive closure 4.26 (0.72) 4.30 (0.79) -.07 .25*** .34*** .02 .15* --- -.29* -.36** .35** -.16 .02 .35** .26* 
 7.   Openness to experience 4.97 (0.74) 4.76 (0.81) .02 -.11
† -.29*** -.25*** -.22*** -.32*** --- .50*** -.22† .33** .10 -.41*** -.33** 
 8.   Experience seeking 4.16 (1.02) 4.30 (1.04) -.01 -.26*** -.48*** -.16* -.23*** -.34*** .43*** --- -.33** -.05 .15 -.32** -.54*** 
 9.   Dangerous world 4.02 (0.73) 4.08 (0.73) .13* -.00 .34*** -.16* .08 .09 -.03 -.07 --- -.23
† -.11 .44*** .25* 
10.  Disease avoidance 4.03 (1.07) 4.04 (1.19) -.05 .01 .13* .06 .04 .09 -.08 -.23*** .14* --- -.22 .02 .14 
11.  Fear of death 3.29 (1.39) 3.54 (1.44) .02 .15* -.04 -.04 -.03 .19** -.06 .01 .06 .08 --- .01! -.21† 
12. Terrorism concerns 4.56 (1.24) 5.13 (1.16) -.05 -.11 .23*** .10 .10 .19** -.10 -.11
† .29*** .14* -.01 --- .33** 
13.  Self-reported ideology 4.09 (1.49) 4.09 (1.54) .03 .11
† .62*** .32*** .43*** .15* -.19** -.35*** .19** .12† -.16* .30*** --- 
14.  ACT score a b 25.56 (3.54) 25.22 (3.55) -.05 -.08 -.25*** .09 -.06 -.07 .12
† .04 -.28*** -.06 -.08 -.01 -.11† 
  ------------------------------------------  AFTER TERROR ATTACK  --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Note: Means, standard deviations, and correlation coefficients reported above and below the table diagonal correspond to participation before and after the Brussels terror attack, 
respectively. RWA = Right-Wing Authoritarianism; SDO = Social Dominance Orientation; Self-reported ideology (1 = very liberal, 7 = very conservative). 
 
Participation Before: N = 65 (aN = 61); Participation after: N = 235 (bN = 229) 
 
***p ≤ .001  **p ≤ .01  *p ≤ .05  †p ≤ .10 
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Table 5 
Zero-order correlations with participation time before/after Brussels terror attack and descriptive statistics (Study 2).  
        
                  Variable Days Before Attack (-12 to -4)  
 
Days After 
Attack (6 to 23) 
Before Attack 
M (SD) 
 
1 Week After 
M (SD) 
2 Weeks After 
M (SD) 
3 Weeks After 
M (SD) 
        
       
 1.   Familiarity bias  .05 .04 0.27 (0.82) 0.29 (0.79) 0.36 (0.81) 0.34 (0.72) 
 2.   Familiarity preference (self-report) -.10 -.04 4.42 (0.65) 4.27 (0.69) 4.16 (0.66) 4.28 (0.70) 
 3.   Right-Wing Authoritarianism -.08 -.11† 3.56 (0.97) 3.81 (0.90) 3.70 (0.94) 3.60 (0.96) 
 4.   System justification .03 -.10 3.88 (0.96) 3.86 (0.97) 3.74 (0.84) 3.71 (0.76) 
 5.   Social Dominance Orientation -.01 .08 3.09 (0.99) 3.22 (1.05) 3.30 (0.99) 3.49 (0.92) 
 6.   Need for cognitive closure .12 -.16* 4.26 (0.72) 4.53 (0.84) 4.10 (0.74) 4.35 (0.67) 
 7.   Openness to experience -.07 .15* 4.97 (0.74) 4.59 (0.85) 4.85 (0.78) 4.85 (0.75) 
 8.   Experience seeking .02 .16* 4.16 (1.02) 4.11 (1.07) 4.40 (1.07) 4.44 (0.86) 
 9.   Belief in a dangerous world -.09 -.01 4.02 (0.73) 4.11 (0.85) 4.02 (0.72) 4.16 (0.45) 
10.  Disease avoidance .14 -.12† 4.03 (1.07) 4.18 (1.13) 3.98 (1.24) 3.92 (1.17) 
11.  Fear of death -.05 .03 3.29 (1.39) 3.50 (1.41) 3.51 (1.46) 3.68 (1.45) 
12.  International terrorism concerns -.04 -.06 4.56 (1.24) 5.21 (1.14) 5.10 (1.26) 5.07 (0.90) 
13.  Self-reported ideology -.22† -.04 4.09 (1.49) 4.15 (1.48) 4.05 (1.55) 4.03 (1.64) 
       
         
Note: RWA = Right-Wing Authoritarianism; SDO = Social Dominance Orientation; Self-reported ideology (1 = very liberal, 7 = very conservative). 
 
Participation Before Attack: N = 65; Participation After Attack: N = 235 (1 week = 85, 2 weeks = 110, 3 weeks = 40) 
 
***p ≤ .001  **p ≤ .01  *p ≤ .05  †p ≤ .10 
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Table 6 
 Right-wing ideology, needs for certainty, and needs for security as a function of time before/after Brussels terror attack (Study 2). 
     
MANCOVA1 / MANOVA2 
Dependent Variables 
Days Before1 
Attack (-12 to -4)  
Days After1 
Attack (6 to 23) 
Before Attack / Weeks After Attack2 
(Before, 1 Week, 2 Weeks, 3 Weeks) 
     
    
   Right-Wing Ideology 
         RWA  
         System justification 
         Social Dominance 
Orientation 
Wilk's Λ = 0.99, F(3, 61) = 0.16, p > .92 
b = -0.03, SE = .04, t(61) = 0.62, p > .52 
b = 0.01, SE = .04, t(61) = 0.20, p > .84 
b = -0.01, SE = .04, t(61) = 0.11, p > .91 
Wilk's Λ = 0.96, F(3, 231) = 3.33, p = .02  
b = -0.02, SE = .01, t(231) = 1.73, p = .085 
b = 0.01, SE = .01, t(231) = 1.52, p = .131 
b = -0.01, SE = .01, t(231) = 1.27, p = .201 
Wilk's Λ = 0.96, F(3, 231) = 3.33, p = .02 
a linear contrast = 0.24, t(296) = 1.69, p = .092 
a linear contrast = 0.07, t(296) = 0.51, p > .60 
a linear contrast = -0.07, t(296) = 0.48, p = .63 
   Epistemic Needs for Certainty 
         Need for cognitive closure  
         Openness to experience 
         Experience seeking 
Wilk's Λ = 0.97, F(3, 61) = 0.54, p > .65  
b = 0.03, SE = .03, t(61) = 0.98, p > .32 
b = -0.02, SE = .03, t(61) = 0.56, p > .57 
b = 0.01, SE = .04, t(61) = 0.16, p = .87 
Wilk's Λ = 0.96, F(3, 231) = 3.50, p < .02 
b = -0.03, SE = .01, t(231) = 2.49, p = .014 
b = 0.02, SE = .01, t(231) = 2.33, p = .021 
b = 0.03, SE = .01, t(231) = 2.50, p = .013 
Wilk's Λ = 0.92, F(9, 716) = 2.88, p = .002 
a linear contrast = 0.23, t(296) = 2.03, p = .044 
b linear contrast = 0.32, t(296) = 2.73, p = .007 
b linear contrast = 0.19, t(296) = 1.25, p = .213 
   Existential Needs for Security 
         Dangerous world  
         Disease avoidance 
         Fear of death 
Wilk's Λ = 0.96, F(3, 61) = 0.81, p > .49  
b = -0.02, SE = .03, t(61) = 0.70, p > .48 
b = 0.05, SE = .05, t(61) = 1.13, p > .26 
b = -0.03, SE = .06, t(61) = 0.43, p > .67 
Wilk's Λ = 0.99, F(3, 231) = 1.20, p = .31 
b = -0.001, SE = .01, t(231) = 0.07, p > .94 
b = -0.03, SE = .02, t(231) = 1.80, p = .074 
b = 0.01, SE = .02, t(231) = 0.47, p > .64 
Wilk's Λ = 0.99, F(3, 231) = 1.20, p = .31  
a linear contrast = 0.02, t(296) = 0.19, p > .85 
a linear contrast = 0.21, t(296) = 1.19, p > .23 
a linear contrast = 0.01, t(296) = 0.05, p > .95 
    
 
 
a linear contrast weights:  -.5, 1, 0, -.5 
 
b linear contrast weights:  .5, -1, 0, .5 
 
Participation Before Attack: N = 65; Participation After Attack: N = 235 (1 week = 85, 2 weeks = 110, 3 weeks = 40) 
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VIII.! Appendices  
 
A.! Study 1 Measures 
 
Right-Wing Authoritarianism scale (Rattazzi et al., 2007): 
 
Our country desperately needs a mighty leader who will do what has to be done to destroy the 
radical new ways and sinfulness that are ruining us. 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
Atheists and others who have rebelled against the established religions are no doubt every bit as 
good and virtuous as those who attend church regularly.* 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
A lot of our rules regarding sexual behavior are just customs which are not necessarily any better 
or holier than those which other people follow.* 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
The majority of those who criticize proper authorities in government and religion only create 
useless doubts in people’s mind. 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
There is absolutely nothing wrong with nudist camps.* 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
Homosexuals and feminists should be praised for being brave enough to defy “traditional family 
values.”* 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
The situation in our country is getting so serious, the strongest method would be justified if they 
eliminated the troublemakers and got us back to our true path. 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
Everyone should have their own lifestyle, religious beliefs, and sexual preferences, even if it 
makes them different from everyone else.* 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
People should pay less attention to the Church and the Pope, and instead develop their own 
personal standards of what is moral and immoral.* 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
It is good that nowadays young people have greater freedom “to make their own rules” and to 
protest against things they don’t like.* 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
What our country really needs instead of more “civil rights” is a good stiff dose of law and order. 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
 !
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Obedience and respect for authority are the most important values children should learn. 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
The fact on crime, sexual immorality and the recent public disorders all show we have to 
crackdown harder on deviant groups and troublemakers, if we are going to save our moral 
standards and preserve law and order. 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
What our country needs most is disciplined citizens, following national leaders in unity. 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
 
Social Dominance Orientation scale (Pratto et al., 1994): 
 
Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups. 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
In getting what you want, it is sometimes necessary to use force against other groups. 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
It’s OK if some groups have more of a chance in life than others. 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
To get ahead in life, it is sometimes necessary to step on other groups. 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
If certain groups stayed in their place, we would have fewer problems. 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
It’s probably a good thing that certain groups are at the top and other groups are at the bottom. 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
Inferior groups should stay in their place.  
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
Sometimes other groups must be kept in their place.  
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
It would be good if groups could be equal.* 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
Group equality should be our ideal.* 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
All groups should be given an equal chance in life.* 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
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We should do what we can to equalize conditions for different groups.* 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
Increased social equality is beneficial to society.* 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
We would have fewer problems if we treated people more equally.* 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
We should strive to make incomes as equal as possible.* 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
No group should dominate in society.* 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
 
Short-form version of Need for Cognitive Closure scale (Roets & Van Hiel, 2011): 
 
I don't like situations that are uncertain. 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
I dislike questions which could be answered in many different ways. 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
I find that a well ordered life with regular hours suits my temperament. 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
I feel uncomfortable when I don't understand the reason why an event occurred in my life. 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
I feel irritated when one person disagrees with what everyone else in a group believes. 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
I don't like to go into a situation without knowing what I can expect from it. 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
When I have made a decision, I feel relieved. 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
When I am confronted with a problem, I’m dying to reach a solution very quickly. 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
I would quickly become impatient and irritated if I would not find a solution to a problem 
immediately. 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
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I don't like to be with people who are capable of unexpected actions. 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
I dislike it when a person's statement could mean many different things. 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
I find that establishing a consistent routine enables me to enjoy life more. 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
I enjoy having a clear and structured mode of life. 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
I do not usually consult many different opinions before forming my own view. 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
I dislike unpredictable situations. 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
 
Short-form version of Need for Cognition scale (Caccioppo et al., 1984): 
 
I would prefer complex to simple problems. 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
I like to have the responsibility of handling a situation that requires a lot of thinking. 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
Thinking is not my idea of fun.* 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
I would rather do something that requires little thought than something that is sure to challenge 
my thinking abilities.* 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
I try to anticipate and avoid situations where there is a likely chance I will have to think in-depth 
about something.* 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
I find satisfaction in deliberating hard and for long hours. 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
I only think as hard as I have to.* 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
I prefer to think about small, daily projects to long-term ones.* 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
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I like tasks that require little thought once I've learned them.* 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
The idea of relying on thought to make my way to the top appeals to me. 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
I really enjoy a task that involves coming up with new solutions to problems. 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
Learning new ways to think doesn't excite me very much.* 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
I prefer my life to be filled with puzzles that I must solve. 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
The notion of thinking abstractly is appealing to me. 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
I would prefer a task that is intellectual, difficult, and important to one that is somewhat 
important but does not require much thought. 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
I feel relief rather than satisfaction after completing a task that required a lot of mental effort.* 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
It's enough for me that something gets the job done; I don't care how or why it works.* 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
I usually end up deliberating about issues even when they do not affect me personally. 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
 
 
 
* Indicates reverse-scored item.  
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B.! Study 2 Measures 
 
Perception of a Dangerous World scale (Duckitt, 2001): 
 
Although it may appear that things are constantly getting more dangerous and chaotic, it really 
isn't so. Every era has its problems, and a person's chances of living a safe, untroubled life are 
better today then ever before.* 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
Any day now chaos and anarchy could erupt around us. All signs are pointing to it. 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
There are many dangerous people in our society who will attack someone out of pure meanness, 
for no reason at all. 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
Despite what one hears about "crime on the street", there probably isn't any more now than there 
ever has been.* 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
If a person takes a few sensible precautions, nothing bad is likely to happen to him or her; we do 
not live in a dangerous world.* 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
Every day as society becomes more lawless and bestial, a person's chances of being robbed, 
assaulted, and even murdered go up and up.  
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
My knowledge and experiences tell me that the social world we live is basically a safe, stable, 
and secure place in which most people are fundamentally good.* 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
It seems every year there are fewer and fewer truly respectable people, and more and more 
persons with no morals at all who threaten everyone else. 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
The “end” is not near. People who think that earthquakes, wars, and famines mean God might be 
about to destroy the world are being foolish.* 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
My knowledge and experience tell me that the social world we live in is basically a dangerous 
and unpredictable place, in which good, decent, and moral people’s values and way of life are 
threatened and disrupted by bad people. 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
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Fear of Death subscale of Death Attitude Profile-Revised (Wong et al., 1994): 
 
Death is no doubt a grim experience.
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
The prospects of my own death arouses anxiety in me. 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
I am disturbed by the finality of death. 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
I have an intense fear of death. 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
The subject of life after death troubles me greatly. 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
The fact that death will mean the end of everything as I know it frightens me. 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
The uncertainty of not knowing what happens after death worries me. 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
 
Disease Avoidance subscale of Fundamental Social Motives Inventory (Neel et al., 2016): 
 
I avoid places and people that might carry diseases. 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
I avoid people who might have a contagious illness. 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
I worry about catching colds and flu from too much contact with other people. 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
I do not worry very much about getting germs from others.* 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
When someone near me is sick, it doesn’t bother me very much.* 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
I don’t mind being around people who are sick.* 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
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Short-form version of Need for Cognitive Closure scale (Roets & Van Hiel, 2011): 
 
I don't like situations that are uncertain. 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
I dislike questions which could be answered in many different ways. 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
I find that a well ordered life with regular hours suits my temperament. 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
I feel uncomfortable when I don't understand the reason why an event occurred in my life. 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
I feel irritated when one person disagrees with what everyone else in a group believes. 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
I don't like to go into a situation without knowing what I can expect from it. 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
When I have made a decision, I feel relieved. 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
When I am confronted with a problem, I’m dying to reach a solution very quickly. 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
I would quickly become impatient and irritated if I would not find a solution to a problem 
immediately. 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
I don't like to be with people who are capable of unexpected actions. 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
I dislike it when a person's statement could mean many different things. 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
I find that establishing a consistent routine enables me to enjoy life more. 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
I enjoy having a clear and structured mode of life. 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
I do not usually consult many different opinions before forming my own view. 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
I dislike unpredictable situations. 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
 !
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Openness to Experience subscale of Big Five Inventory (John et al., 2008): 
 
I am someone who… 
 
Is original, comes up with new ideas. 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
 Is curious about many different things. 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
 Is ingenious, a deep thinker. 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
 Has an active imagination. 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
 Is inventive. 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
 Values artistic, aesthetic experiences. 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
 Prefers work that is routine.* 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
 Likes to reflect, play with ideas. 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
 Has few artistic interests.* 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
 Is sophisticated in art, music, or literature. 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
 
Experience-Seeking subscale of Sensation Seeking scale (Zuckerman et al., 1978): 
 
I like some of the earthy body smells. 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
I like to explore a strange city or section of town myself, even if it means getting lost. 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
I have tried marijuana or would like to. 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
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I would like to try some of the new drugs that produce hallucinations. 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
I like to try new foods that I have never tasted before. 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
I would like to take off on a trip with no preplanned or definite routes or timetables. 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
I would like to make friends in sonic of the "far-out" groups like artists or "hippies." 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
I would like to meet some persons who are homosexual (men or women). 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
I often find beauty in the "clashing" colors and irregular form of modern painting. 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
People should dress in individual ways even if the effects are sometimes strange.  
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
 
Right-Wing Authoritarianism scale (Rattazzi et al., 2007): 
 
Our country desperately needs a mighty leader who will do what has to be done to destroy the 
radical new ways and sinfulness that are ruining us. 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
Atheists and others who have rebelled against the established religions are no doubt every bit as 
good and virtuous as those who attend church regularly.* 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
A lot of our rules regarding sexual behavior are just customs which are not necessarily any better 
or holier than those which other people follow.* 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
The majority of those who criticize proper authorities in government and religion only create 
useless doubts in people’s mind. 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
There is absolutely nothing wrong with nudist camps.* 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
Homosexuals and feminists should be praised for being brave enough to defy “traditional family 
values.”* 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
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The situation in our country is getting so serious, the strongest method would be justified if they 
eliminated the troublemakers and got us back to our true path. 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
Everyone should have their own lifestyle, religious beliefs, and sexual preferences, even if it 
makes them different from everyone else.* 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
People should pay less attention to the Church and the Pope, and instead develop their own 
personal standards of what is moral and immoral.* 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
It is good that nowadays young people have greater freedom “to make their own rules” and to 
protest against things they don’t like.* 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
What our country really needs instead of more “civil rights” is a good stiff dose of law and order. 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
Obedience and respect for authority are the most important values children should learn. 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
The fact on crime, sexual immorality and the recent public disorders all show we have to 
crackdown harder on deviant groups and troublemakers, if we are going to save our moral 
standards and preserve law and order. 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
What our country needs most is disciplined citizens, following national leaders in unity. 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
 
Social Dominance Orientation scale (Ho et al., 2015): 
 
An ideal society requires some groups to be on top and others to be on the bottom.  
Strongly Oppose         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Favor 
Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups. 
Strongly Oppose         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Favor 
No one group should dominate in society.* 
Strongly Oppose         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Favor 
Groups at the bottom are just as deserving as groups at the top.* 
Strongly Oppose         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Favor 
Group equality should not be our primary goal. 
Strongly Oppose         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Favor 
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It is unjust to try to make groups equal. 
Strongly Oppose         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Favor 
We should do what we can to equalize conditions for different groups.* 
Strongly Oppose         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Favor 
We should work to give all groups an equal chance to succeed.* 
Strongly Oppose         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Favor 
 
System Justification scale (Kay & Jost, 2003): 
 
In general, you find society to be fair. 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
In general, the American political system operates as it should. 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
American society needs to be radically restructured.* 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
The United States is the best country in the world to live in. 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
Most policies serve the greater good. 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
Everyone has a fair shot at wealth and happiness. 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
Our society is getting worse every year.* 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
Society is set up so that people usually get what they deserve. 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
 
Perceived Threat of International Terrorism (adapted from Ullrich & Cohrs, 2007): 
 
International terrorism a real threat facing the American people. 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
International terrorism will soon hit the United States. 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
The risk of terror attacks in the United States is low.* 
Strongly Disagree         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Strongly Agree 
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C.! Low vs. High Threat Salience 
 
Given a rise in trade throughout the world, we are interested in people’s opinions on the 
issue of international tourism. Please read the following information carefully. You’ll be 
asked some follow-up questions later. 
 
There is growing interest in international tourism among American citizens. Tourism companies 
from all over the world have been rapidly expanding, particularly those companies in South Asia, 
the Middle East, and along the coasts of South America. These expanding operations include the 
development of personalized vacation packages and study abroad programs for college and high 
school students. Much of the success of the international tourism industry has been spurred by 
advances in communication technologies and efficient mass transportation. Compared to the 
average cost a decade ago, Americans today enjoy significantly cheaper access to several means 
of international transport—jumbo jets, cruise liners, and even trains in some areas. With the 
steady increase in Americans’ access to affordable international travel, Forbes magazine projects 
further economic opportunities to sprout within the tourism industry. 
 
--- 
 
Given a rise in terror attacks throughout the Western world, we are interested in people’s 
opinions on the issue of international terrorism. Please read the following information 
carefully. You’ll be asked some follow-up questions later. 
 
There is growing concern about another major terrorist attack on American soil. The Middle East 
has become especially unstable in recent years, giving way to terrorist organizations such as al-
Qaeda, ISIS, and Kata'ib Hezbollah. Since the Word Trade Center attack on September 11, 2001 
in New York, the Western world has seen a steady increase in international terror attacks—
Madrid train bombings in 2004, London bus and tube bombings in 2005, Charlie Hebdo arson in 
2011 and shootings in 2015, Boston Marathon bombing in 2013, and most recently the terror 
attacks on Paris in November of 2015. With the continued release of videos depicting beheadings 
of American journalists, and direct threats aimed at the United States, the National Terrorism 
Advisory System is expected to to issue an Elevated Terror Threat Alert. 
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D.! Demographics Survey 
 
 
Age ____ 
 
Gender:  M  or   F 
 
Race/Ethnicity _______________ 
 
Are you more liberal or more conservative?  
Very Liberal         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         Very Conservative 
 
Are you more of a Democrat or more of a Republican? 
More Democrat         1       2       3       4       5       6       7         More Republican 
 
What political party do you identify with? (Study 2 only) 
 Democratic Party 
 Republican Party 
 Libertarian Party 
 Green Party 
 Constitution Party 
 Other 
 None / Independent 
 I don’t follow politics 
 
What is religion do you identify with? (Study 2 only) 
 
ACT/SAT score _______ 
 
Is English your second language? 
 No, English is my first/primary language 
 Yes, English is my second language 
 
Do you speak Chinese? 
 No 
 Yes, I speak some Chinese 
 Yes, I speak Chinese fluently
 !
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E.! IRB Protocol Approval 
  
109 MLKG • 1 University of Arkansas • Fayetteville, AR 72701-1201 • (479) 575-2208 • Fax (479) 575-6527 • Email irb@uark.edu 
The University of Arkansas is an equal opportunity/affirmative action institution. 
Office of Research Compliance  
Institutional Review Board 
October(6,(2015(
(
MEMORANDUM(
(
TO:( John(Blanchar(
( Scott(Eidelman(
( ( (
FROM:( Ro(Windwalker(
( IRB(Coordinator(
(
RE:( New(Protocol(Approval(
(
IRB(Protocol(#:( 15L09L141(
(
Protocol(Title:( Bias%from%Familiarity%
(
Review(Type:( (EXEMPT( (EXPEDITED( (FULL(IRB(
(
Approved(Project(Period:( Start(Date:(10/05/2015((Expiration(Date:((10/04/2016(
(
Your(protocol(has(been(approved(by(the(IRB.((Protocols(are(approved(for(a(maximum(period(of(
one(year.((If(you(wish(to(continue(the(project(past(the(approved(project(period((see(above),(you(
must(submit(a(request,(using(the(form(Continuing%Review%for%IRB%Approved%Projects,(prior(to(the(
expiration(date.((This(form(is(available(from(the(IRB(Coordinator(or(on(the(Research(Compliance(
website((https://vpred.uark.edu/units/rscp/index.php).((As(a(courtesy,(you(will(be(sent(a(reminder(
two(months(in(advance(of(that(date.((However,(failure(to(receive(a(reminder(does(not(negate(
your(obligation(to(make(the(request(in(sufficient(time(for(review(and(approval.((Federal(
regulations(prohibit(retroactive(approval(of(continuation.((Failure(to(receive(approval(to(continue(
the(project(prior(to(the(expiration(date(will(result(in(Termination(of(the(protocol(approval.((The(
IRB(Coordinator(can(give(you(guidance(on(submission(times.(
This%protocol%has%been%approved%for%1,500%participants.((If(you(wish(to(make(any(
modifications(in(the(approved(protocol,(including(enrolling(more(than(this(number,(you(must(
seek(approval(prior%to%implementing(those(changes.((All(modifications(should(be(requested(in(
writing((email(is(acceptable)(and(must(provide(sufficient(detail(to(assess(the(impact(of(the(
change.(
If(you(have(questions(or(need(any(assistance(from(the(IRB,(please(contact(me(at(109(MLKG(
Building,(5L2208,(or(irb@uark.edu.
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109 MLKG • 1 University of Arkansas • Fayetteville, AR 72701-1201 • (479) 575-2208 • Fax (479) 575-6527 • Email irb@uark.edu 
The University of Arkansas is an equal opportunity/affirmative action institution. 
Office of Research Compliance  
Institutional Review Board 
March&7,&2016&
&
MEMORANDUM&
&
TO:& John&Blanchar&
& Scott&Eidelman&
&
FROM:& Ro&Windwalker&
& IRB&Coordinator&
&
RE:& PROJECT&MODIFICATION&
&
IRB&Protocol&#:& 15J09J1441&
&
Protocol&Title:& Bias%from%Familiarity%
%
Review&Type:& &EXEMPT& &EXPEDITED& &FULL&IRB&
&
Approved&Project&Period:& Start&Date:&&03/04/2016&&Expiration&Date:&&10/04/2016&&
&
Your&request&to&modify&the&referenced&protocol&has&been&approved&by&the&IRB.&&This%protocol%is%
currently%approved%for%1,900%total%participants.&If&you&wish&to&make&any&further&modifications&in&the&
approved&protocol,&including&enrolling&more&than&this&number,&you&must&seek&approval&prior%to%
implementing&those&changes.&&All&modifications&should&be&requested&in&writing&(email&is&acceptable)&and&
must&provide&sufficient&detail&to&assess&the&impact&of&the&change.&
Please&note&that&this&approval&does&not&extend&the&Approved&Project&Period.&&Should&you&wish&to&
extend&your&project&beyond&the&current&expiration&date,&you&must&submit&a&request&for&continuation&
using&the&UAF&IRB&form&“Continuing&Review&for&IRB&Approved&Projects.”&&The&request&should&be&sent&to&
the&IRB&Coordinator,&109&MLKG&Building.&&&
For&protocols&requiring&FULL&IRB&review,&please&submit&your&request&at&least&one&month&prior&to&the&
current&expiration&date.&(HighJrisk&protocols&may&require&even&more&time&for&approval.)&&For&protocols&
requiring&an&EXPEDITED&or&EXEMPT&review,&submit&your&request&at&least&two&weeks&prior&to&the&
current&expiration&date.&&Failure&to&obtain&approval&for&a&continuation&on%or%prior%to&the&currently&
approved&expiration&date&will&result&in&termination&of&the&protocol&and&you&will&be&required&to&submit&a&
new&protocol&to&the&IRB&before&continuing&the&project.&&Data&collected&past&the&protocol&expiration&date&
may&need&to&be&eliminated&from&the&dataset&should&you&wish&to&publish.&&Only&data&collected&under&a&
currently&approved&protocol&can&be&certified&by&the&IRB&for&any&purpose.&&&&
If&you&have&questions&or&need&any&assistance&from&the&IRB,&please&contact&me&at&109&MLKG&Building,&
5J2208,&or&irb@uark.edu. 
 
